Abstract:
An overwhelming reliance on expert consensus is a fact of contemporary social existence. The rationale for this reliance, presumably, is that expert consensus is based on, and hence indicates scientific knowledge, where knowledge is standardly understood as being based on facts (factivity). It becomes important then to delineate conditions under which expert consensus reliably indicates scientific knowledge. Philosophical investigations into the topic have highlighted the necessity of both evidential and institutional factors in this regard. This presentation focuses on necessary evidential criteria for knowledge-indicating consensus and argues that, at least in some domains of scientific inquiry, expert consensus cannot reliably indicate scientific knowledge. More precisely, it is argued that epistemic luck cannot be eliminated without violating the requirement of factivity. We are thus left with a dilemma – either we deny that expert consensus is a reliable indicator of scientific knowledge, or we understand scientific knowledge as a non-factive epistemic achievement.
Date: Tuesday, 18 October 2022
Time: 5:30 p.m.
Venue: HSS Seminar Hall
YouTube Livestream Link: https://youtu.be/7oxaB1xYQ3E