This Subject Includes

  • Course No: HS 746
  • Course: Ph.D Programme
  • Semester: I
  • Title: Social Epistemology
  • Stream: Philosophy
  • Preamble / Objectives (Optional): As a point of departure from traditional concerns, social epistemology

    privileges the social relations and institutions the epistemic agent finds herself embedded in. This course

    discusses the motivations behind expanding the ambit of philosophical concerns, and introduces the

    students to contemporary epistemological debates on testimony, disagreement, and knowledge attribution

    to collectives.

     

    Course Content/ Syllabus

    Social epistemology: traditional epistemology as individualistic, challenge from sociology of knowledge and

    social constructivism, veritism, historical antecedents; Testimony: justificatory status of testimony,

    testimonial reductionism and anti-reductionism, transmission of warrant, academic publications and peer-

    review; Disagreement: rational disagreement, reasonable disagreement, deep disagreement, epistemic

    peerhood and expertise, steadfastness and conciliationism, disagreement in science; Epistemology of

    groups: judgment aggregation, ontological status of epistemic groups, justifiedness of collective agents,

    division of collective labour, epistemology of Wikipedia

     

    Books (In case UG compulsory courses, please give it as “Text books” and “Reference books”. Otherwise

    give it as “References”.

    Texts: (Format: Authors, Book Title in Italics font, Volume/Series, Edition Number, Publisher, Year.)

     

    References: (Format: Authors, Book Title in Italics font, Volume/Series, Edition Number, Publisher, Year.)

    1. A.I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World, OUP, 1999

    2. C. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Clarendon Press, 1992

    3. Feldman R. and T. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, OUP, 2010

    4. Goldman, A. I. and D. Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, OUP, 2011

    5. J. Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, OUP, 2014